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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940324-CA 
v. : 
DAVID L. MILLS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for attempted riot, 
a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-101(1) & (3), 
76-2-202 and 76-4-102(4) (1994) and attempted injury to a jail, a 
class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-418, 76-2-202, 
76-4-102(4) (1994). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court comply with the requirements of 
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting 
defendant's guilty pleas? 
Defendant affirmatively declined to specify any 
particular rule 11 challenge to his guilty pleas in moving to 
withdraw the pleas below, nor has he argued exceptional 
circumstances or plain error on appeal. Accordingly, defendant's 
allegation of a rule 11 violation is waived, State v. Jennings. 
875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). See also State v. Gibbons. 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that 
defendant entered his guilty pleas voluntarily? 
A guilty plea "'may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the [trial] court.'11 State v. Thorup. 
841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2) (a) (1990)), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). "A 
'withdrawal of plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right . . . 
[and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Gallecros, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). 
"On appeal the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a 
guilty plea will not be disturbed 'unless it clearly appears that 
the trial court abused its discretion.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Truiillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11 (e) (attached as Addendum D). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with riot, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-101(1) & (3) and 76-2-202 
(1994), and injury to a jail, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-418 and 76-2-202 (1994) (R. 82-84) . 
Pursuant to a package plea bargain agreement, defendant 
and two codefendants plead to reduced charges: Defendant pled 
2 
guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor, and to attempted 
injury to a jail, also a class A misdemeanor (R. 194-97). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent 
one year terms (R. 210). 
Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
on the ground that they were not voluntary (R. 215-16) (copies of 
defendant's motion, affidavit, and memorandum are attached as 
Addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 233-34) (a copy of the 
order is attached as Addendum C). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On August 9, 1993, five inmates, including defendant, 
at the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) refused a "rack 
in" order and started a riot (R. 4, 6). The inmates breached the 
secure section door to Cedar, Section I, and entered into the 
sallyport area around the control room (R. 4). Defendant 
participated in the riot by breaking out several cell door 
windows (R. 6). Total damage to the facility amounted to over 
$36,000 (R. 4)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
This Court should not consider defendant's challenge to 
the trial court's compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, for the first time on direct appeal. Defendant has 
1
 As defendant's convictions resulted from his pleas of 
guilty rather than a trial on the merits, the facts are gleaned 
from the probable cause affidavit (R. 4-6). 
3 
not articulated a plain error, nor any other exceptional 
circumstance that would excuse his affirmative waiver of the 
issue in his opening brief. Accordingly, defendant's remedy, if 
any, must now be pursued under rule 65(B), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
POINT II 
Although defendant did raise a voluntariness challenge 
to his guilty pleas below, he failed to substantiate his 
allegations of coercion at the plea withdrawal hearing. Indeed, 
defendant admitted that neither of his codefendants ever 
threatened him to accept the package plea agreement. 
Accordingly, defendant's claims of coercion on appeal are 
unsupported by the record and fail to demonstrate that the trial 




DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY DECLINED TO SPECIFY 
ANY RULE 11 CHALLENGE TO HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
BELOW AND HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE A PLAIN 
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE EXCUSING 
HIS WAIVER IN HIS OPENING BRIEF; ACCORDINGLY, 
DEFENDANT'S RULE 11 CHALLENGE HAS NOT BEEN 
PRESERVED FOR REVIEW ON DIRECT APPEAL 
"[0]rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain 
an issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error." State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App. 
1992). The waiver rule applies to constitutional issues as well. 
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State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). The 
reasoning behind the waiver rule was stated by this Court in 
State v. Brown; 
The purpose of requiring a properly presented 
objection is to *put[] the judge on notice of 
the asserted error and allow[] the 
opportunity for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding.' The trial 
court is considered 'the proper forum in 
which to commence thoughtful and probing 
analysis' of issues. Failing to argue an 
issue and present pertinent evidence in that 
forum denies the trial court %the opportunity 
to make any findings of fact or conclusions 
of law' pertinent to the claimed error. 
856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
In the trial court defendant moved to withdraw his 
guilty pleas on the sole ground that his "pleas were not 
voluntary[,] but were entered to avoid retaliation from his [c]o-
[d]efendants" (R. 215-16), see Addendum A. 
On appeal, defendant raises the additional argument 
that his pleas were taken in violation of rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, claiming that the record fails to indicate 
that he waived his constitutional right against self-
incrimination, or that he understood the nature and elements of 
the offenses to which he pled. Br. of App. at 26. However, 
defendant has not alleged plain error or any exceptional 
circumstance that would excuse the obvious waiver of his rule 11 
challenge. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) 
(declining to address rule 11 challenge on appeal because 
defendant "failed" to raise the issue below and "[did] not assert 
either exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal"). See 
5 
also State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 & n.5. (Utah App. 
1992) (declining to review a scope of detention challenge first 
raised on appeal and about which the defendant neither argued 
exceptional circumstances nor plain error); cf. State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992) (disavowing the "liberty 
interest" where used for the purpose of carving out an additional 
exception to the traditional plain error standard). 
Rather, the "Standard of Review" portion of defendant's 
brief refers generally to State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), and State 
v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989), for the broad 
proposition that the Court will consider a rule 11 challenge for 
the first time on appeal. Br. of App. at 3. While Pharris and 
Valencia are less than clear concerning an appellant's burden to 
assert plain error or exceptional circumstances to excuse waiver, 
the Court's later Jennings decision is clear as to those 
requirements and is also consistent with the Utah's well 
established wavier rule. 875 P.2d at 570. See also Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1311 (where defendant had not yet moved to withdraw 
guilty plea, supreme court remanded for that purpose, recognizing 
that disposition was "consonant" with its "policy of allowing 
trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged error" 
(citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983)). The Court 
should refuse to consider the trial court's rule 11 compliance 
for the first time on direct appeal. 
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Further, the record does not support an inference that 
there was any reason unknown or unavailable to defendant that 
would have prevented him from raising these rule 11 challenges at 
the plea withdrawal hearing. To the contrary, defense counsel 
affirmatively declined to specify any particular rule 11 
challenge: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: One other item, Your 
Honor. At this time we do not wish to 
address a strict compliance requirements 
[sic] with the Rule 1 1 M UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. However, we would like 
to reserve that procedure, if this ruling is 
is [sic] adverse to us today. 
THE COURT: Adverse what issue? Tell me what 
you're talking about. Get specific. You 
claim I didn't comply with Rule 11? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't want to claim 
that right now, but I would like to reserve 
that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you were present. Didn't I 
ask you at one time if there was any reason 
why I should not sentence them? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, you did, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You told me there was no reason; 
isn't that what you told me? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, I believe I did. 
THE COURT: Now you don't want to be bound by 
that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. I don't want to be 
bound by whether--
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. 
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(Transcript of withdrawal hearing, May 4, 1994, PWTr. 16-17) (a 
copy of the complete transcript is attached as Addendum B).3 
In light of the above exchange, this is not a case, or 
a circumstance, where the Court should depart from Utah's well 
established waiver policy. See Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570; 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. The Court's recent affirmation of the 
waiver rule's applicability to rule 11 challenges in Jennings, 
casts considerable doubt on the precedential weight, if any, to 
be accorded Pharris and Valencia. Moreover, to consider 
defendant's rule 11 challenge for the first time on appeal, would 
be to reward defense counsel's4 misuse of Utah's judicial 
resources. Indeed, had the issue been timely raised and argued 
to the trial court, it is not clear that the trial court would 
have found rule 11 compliance at the time the guilty plea was 
entered. See (Transcript of Jury Trial, March 21, 1994, JTr. at 
28-36) . Thus, defendant may well have been afforded the 
opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas at the plea withdrawal 
hearing. By expressly reserving the argument below, defense 
counsel essentially by-passed a critical stage of the judicial 
process and jumped straight to this Court for a first time airing 
of his rule 11 allegations. Such wasteful strategy should not be 
condoned. Accordingly, because defendant failed to raise the 
3
 Notwithstanding defense counsel's express reservation 
of the issue, in its Order refusing to allow withdrawal, the 
trial court found that it had in fact complied with rule 11 in 
accepting defendant's pleas (R. 234), see Addendum C. 
4
 Defendant's appellate counsel also represented him at 
the plea taking, and plea withdrawal proceedings below (R. 23). 
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issue below and asserts neither plain error, nor an exceptional 
circumstance argument on appeal, this Court should not reach this 
issue. Defendant's remedy, if any, now lies in a post-conviction 
writ under rule 65(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW GOOD CAUSE, NOR DID 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
GUILTY PLEAS 
As noted above, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
pleas on the sole ground that they were involuntary (R. 215-16), 
see Addendum A. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion, finding that defendant had 
failed to demonstrate "good cause" for withdrawal (R. 234), see 
Addendum C. Defendant's claims of coercion on appeal are 
unsubstantiated and fail to demonstrate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in so ruling. State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 
746, 747 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993) . 
A. Failure to Substantiate Claims of 
Coercion 
Defendant's motion to withdraw claimed that he 
involuntarily pled guilty because he wanted to "avoid retaliation 
from his [c]o-defendants" with whom he had been offered a 
"package" plea agreement (R. 215-16), see Addendum A. The 
package plea agreement required that all codefendant's plead 
guilty to reduced charges, or, alternatively, that all 
codefendants go to trial. Id. Defendant's accompanying 
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affidavit alleged that he felt under "extreme pressure" to accept 
the agreement and that " [i]f he had not accepted the plea 
bargain, [he] could have been exposed to physical and emotional 
retaliation from one of [his] [c]o-defendants" (R. 217-18), see 
Addendum A (emphasis added). 
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant claimed that he 
was initially unwilling to accept the package plea agreement, but 
that he later acquiesced because he did not feel he would get a 
fair trial (PWTr. 6), see Addendum B. Defendant was concerned 
that the jury would be biased against him (PWTr. 6), see Addendum 
B. He also did not want to be tried with his codefendants (PWTr. 
6-7), see Addendum B.5 Defendant then alleged that he felt 
pressure from the "court attorney" and codefendants to accept the 
package deal (PWTr. 6), see Addendum B. However, defendant 
admitted that he did not tell the trial court that his pleas were 
involuntary: 
We [defendant and codefendants] were all 
sitting right there [in court]. Everybody 
was just like it is right how. I mean if I 
would have said that, it would have been just 
the same as me saying no anyway. 
(PWTr. 8), see Addendum B. 
5
 The trial court denied defendant's motion to sever his 
trial from that of codefendants following the preliminary hearing 
(Transcript of preliminary hearing, January 5, 1994, PHTr. at 90-
91). To the extent defendant is asserting that the trial court's 
denial of his severance motion somehow rendered his subsequent 
guilty pleas involuntary, see Br. of App. at 32-33, it is waived 
for failure to allege this below. Jennings. 875 P.2d at 570. 
Defendant has not articulated a plain error or other exceptional 
circumstance excusing the waiver. Id. 
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On cross-examination, defendant reiterated that he had 
not informed the trial court, or defense counsel, that he had 
been threatened, or that he feared retaliation if he refused to 
accept the package plea agreement (PWTr. 9-10), see Addendum B. 
More importantly, defendant admitted that neither codefendant had 
ever threatened him to go along with the plea agreement (PWTr. 
10), see Addendum B. 
On redirect, defendant claimed that his feelings of 
coercion derived from an "unsaid thing. You just--just you know. 
You just know" (PWTr. 10), see Addendum B. Defendant again 
acknowledged that he had never been threatened by his 
codefendants (PWTr. 11), see Addendum B. 
Codefendant Jeffery Eaton's testimony added nothing to 
defendant's claims of coercion. Eaton acknowledged that he felt 
it was in his best interest to accept the plea agreement, and 
that he knew he would not be able to do so if the agreement was 
rejected by his codefendants (PWTr. 12), see Addendum B. Eaton 
denied however, that he had ever threatened defendant with bodily 
injury or any other type of retaliation if defendant did not 
accept the package deal (PWTr. 12), see Addendum B. 
Codefendant Michael Land similarly testified. Like 
Eaton, Land believed the plea agreement was in his best 
interests, particularly after considering the potential jury 
roster (PWTr. 14), see Addendum B. Land also denied having ever 
threatening defendant (PWTr. 15), see Addendum B. 
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Defense counsel made no argument elaborating on 
defendant's allegations of coercion. Rather, as previously 
noted, defense counsel merely indicated his intention to reserve 
any rule 11 challenge to the validity of the pleas until after 
the court had ruled on the voluntariness issue (PWTr. 16-17), see 
Addendum B. 
Based on the above, the trial court denied defendant's 
request to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding "that there were 
not any threats made to the [d]efendant from co-defendants [sic] 
in this case in order to obtain his plea" (R. 234), see Addendum 
C. 
Notwithstanding, on appeal to this Court, defendant 
argues that his pleas were involuntarily entered as a consequence 
of the package deal nature of the plea agreement. Br. of App. at 
29-36. In so arguing, defendant places primary reliance on 
United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1993). In Caro, 
the government offered a package plea agreement to four 
codefendants. Caro subsequently sought to withdraw his plea on 
the ground that his codefendants had pressured him to agree. Id. 
at 659. The trial court denied Caro's motion without benefit of 
an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id. This fact 
distinguishes Caro from the instant facts and undermines 
defendant's reliance thereon. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the prosecutor's description of the 
plea agreement in the trial court had been so ambiguous that it 
12 
was impossible to determine whether the trial court was alerted 
to the package nature of the deal. Caro, 997 F.2d at 659. 
Recognizing that a package deal plea agreement is not per se 
impermissible, the Ninth Circuit clarified its view that a trial 
court should make a more careful voluntariness inquiry under that 
circumstance. 997 F.2d at 659. Accord State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 
539 (Minn. 1994); State v. Solano, 724 P.2d 17, 21 (Ariz. 1986). 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an 
evidentiary hearing on Caro's motion to withdraw his plea, 
directing the trial court to "find whether Caro entered his plea 
because of threats or pressures from his codefendants." 997 F.2d 
at 660. See United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1987) ("The voluntariness test adequately protects the 
criminal defendant's due process rights, while at the same time 
preserving the benefits of the plea bargaining process."), aff'd. 
486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
Defendant complains that the trial court in this case 
was similarly uninformed as to the package nature of the plea 
agreement and therefore failed to properly determine the 
voluntariness of his individual plea. Br. of App. at 35. 
Regardless of whether the trial court was aware of the package 
nature of the deal when defendant initially pled, defendant was 
afforded a subsequent opportunity to argue the alleged coercive 
nature of the package plea agreement at the plea withdrawal 
hearing. Thus defendant has already been afforded the benefit of 
the recommended relief in Caro: A full evidentiary hearing 
13 
concerning the alleged coercion of codefendants.6 As detailed 
above, defendant was unable to substantiate his claims of 
coercion at that hearing. The trial court properly refused to 
allow withdrawal of the pleas on that ground. See Castello, 724 
F.2d at 815 (no abuse of discretion in refusal to allow plea 
withdrawal following hearing on the matter where defendant failed 
to establish clear error in trial court's finding that "there 
were no threats or promises made to defendant at the time she 
entered her plea"). 
Defendant's remaining claims of involuntariness on 
appeal are unsubstantiated and/or inconsequential and similarly 
fail to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow withdrawal. For example, defendant's claims 
that he "never did wish to accept any of the plea bargains 
offered," and that he believed "he stood to gain little by 
pleading guilty," contradict his testimony at the withdrawal 
6
 The United States Supreme Court has reserved judgment 
on "the constitutional implications of a prosecutor's offer 
during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some 
person other than the accused. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978). However, federal circuit court's 
addressing the issue have concluded that third party threats or 
promises are not coercive per se; " [r]ather they have held that 
the trial court should make a more careful examination of the 
voluntariness of a plea when it is induced by such threats or 
promises." United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.) 
(collecting cases), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1254 (1984). Caro 
demonstrates that even where the trial court allegedly fails to 
adequately determine the voluntariness of pleas entered pursuant 
to a package agreement, the situation can be remedied at a 
subsequent evidentiary hearing on the matter. 997 F.2d at 660 
(holding that, if, after remand, "the district court find's 
Caro's assertions of codefendant pressure baseless, the error at 
the Rule 11 stage will be rendered harmless"). 
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hearing. Compare Br. of App. at 32 and (PWTi 6-7, 10), see 
Addendum B. As for defendant's claim that he had good reason to 
fear codefendants, it is inconsistent with his testimony that 
neither codefendant ever threatened him. Compare Br. of App. at 
34 and (PWTr. 10-11), see Addendum B. 
Defendant has similarly overstated the testimony of 
codefendant's Eaton and Land. While defendant claims both 
codefendants believed they would receive earlier parole dates by 
accepting the plea agreement, codefendants merely indicated that 
they thought the plea agreement was in their best interest, and 
did not specify a reason (PWTr. 12, 15), see Addendum B. 
Defendant further claims that codefendants and their trial 
counsel told him that he could not receive a fair trial because 
the jury would be biased against him. Br. of App. at 33. Only 
defendant's self-serving testimony supports his assertion. 
Neither Eaton or Land so testified and their trial counsel was 
not called as a witness at the withdrawal hearing. Even assuming 
defendant is correct as to Eaton and Land's reasoning and advice, 
he has not demonstrated that it had an unfairly coercive effect 
on his individual decision to accept the plea agreement, 
particularly where defendant admits that neither codefendant ever 
threatened him to accept the package deal (PWTr. 10-11), see 
Addendum B. 
B. Failure to Marshal 
Defendant's attempts to cast the evidence in a more 
favorable light suggests that he is really challenging the 
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factual basis in support of the trial court's refusal to allow 
withdrawal of the pleas and it's implicit determination of 
voluntariness. However, an appellant must first marshal the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, 
and then demonstrate that it is insufficient. State v. Larsen, 
828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) ("Our insistence on compliance 
with the marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting 
hypertechnical adherence to form over substance. 'A reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.7 (citation omitted)), aff'd. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
See also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991?); State v. Moosman. 794 
P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) . Based on the analysis in Parts A-
B, supra, defendant has failed to comply with this strict 
requirement. He has thus failed to demonstrate any clear error 
in the trial court's implicit voluntariness finding. Drobel, 815 
P.2d at 735. 
In sum, the record of the plea withdrawal hearing is 
devoid of indication that defendant was threatened or otherwise 
unlawfully coerced into accepting the package plea agreement. 
Indeed, defendant admitted that he decided to accept the plea 
agreement due to his concern about juror bias, particularly where 
he was to be tried with codefendants. He further denied ever 
having been threatened by codefendants and failed to substantiate 
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coercion from any other source. Defendant's alleged internal 
feelings of coercion do not constitute good cause for withdrawal. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should determine that 
defendant affirmatively waived his allegation of a rule 11 
violation. The Court should further determine that defendant's 
claims of involuntariness are unsubstantiated and thus the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow 
withdrawal of the pleas. 
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JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
: GUILTY PLEAS 
vs. :* 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. : 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, : 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. : Case No. 931600154 
MILLS, : 
Defendants. : JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney, 
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby moves the above-entitled court for an 
Order permitting the Defendant to withdraw the pleas of guilty to 
Attempted Riot a class A misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail 
a Class A misdemeanor. These pleas were entered on March 21, 
1994 and therefore motion is timely since the thirty (30) days 
permitted by U.C.A. 77-13-6 have not expired. 
As a basis for this Motion, it is the Defendant's position 
that good cause exists to permit withdrawal of his guilty pleas. 
He alleges that his pleas were not voluntary but were entered to 
avoid retaliation from his Co-Defendants in this case. 
Specifically, there were three Co-Defendants remaining on March 
21, 1994 who had not previously plead guilty. The Sanpete County 
£,fc- C*''^  
<3»S 
State v. Bolin, et al., 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
Page 2 
Attorney offered to reduce the criminal charges facing these 
remaining Co-Defendants in a return for guilty pleas. 
The offers were conveyed to the Co-Defendants but not all 
were willing to accept the offered agreement. Subsequently, the 
Sanpete County Attorney placed a restriction on the offer that if 
all of the Co-Defendants did not accept the offer, then none of 
them would be permitted to accept it individually. 
The Defendant felt that because of the restriction placed on 
the offered agreement, if he had elected not to accept, then he 
would have been subjected to physical and emotional retaliation 
from the Co-Defendants, since they would not have been permitted 
to accept the plea bargain without his concurrence. (The 
Defendant executed an affidavit consistent with these statements 
and is attached as Exhibit A) • 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Pleas be granted and permit the Defendant to be 
tried by a jury for the offenses charged against him. 
DATED this l/* day of April, 1994. 
fMFmY P. GLEAVE 
Akttoxney for Defendant 
^DSvid L. Mills 
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, ! AFFIDAVIT OF 
: DAVID L. MILLS 
vs. : 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, : 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. : Case No. 931600154 
MILLS, : 
Defendant. : JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
David L. Mills, after being duly sworn, states the 
following: 
1) I an one of the Defendants in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2) I involuntarily plead guilty to charges of Attempted 
Riot and Attempt to Injure a Jail, on March 21, 1994. 
3) The reasons my pleas were involuntary are: 
a. The Codefendants were offered as a group a plea 
bargain that by its terms, could only be accepted unanimously by 
all of the Codefendants in this case; and 
b. I felt under extreme pressure from the County 
state v. Bolin, et al., 
Affidavit of David L. Mills 
Page 2 
Attorney to accept this bargain since it was my understanding 
that he would not permit me to go to trial on the charges alone; 
and 
c. If I had not accepted the plea bargain, I could 
have been exposed to physical and emotional retaliation from one 
of my Codefendants who desired to accept the plea bargain. 
DATED this /6*~day of April, 1994. 
a£_^vk 
David L. M i l l s 
Aff iant 
•°JL^ 
FTERY P. GLEAVE 
:orney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f/F— day of April, 
1994. 
/ TfO^ARY PUBLIC / ' 
Residing at: jdpfufst*, Ctr.< ^ 




JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390) 
HUNT & GLEAVE 
Attorney for Defendant 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4424 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A. 
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON, 
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L. 
MILLS, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEAS 
Case No. 931600154 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney, 
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby submits the following memorandum in 
support of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. 
FACTS 
The Defendant along with four Codefendants were charged in 
an information with various criminal violations stemming from a 
disturbance at Central Utah Correctional Facility. Prior to the 
trial date, Phillip J. Bolin and Michael A. Bradley accepted plea 
bargains from the Sanpete County Attorney. The remaining three 
Codefendants did not accept the plea bargains which were offered 
but prepared to undergo a jury trial to determine their guilt or 
innocence. 
On March 21, 1994, the day the scheduled trial was to begin, 
State v. Bolin, et al., 
Memorandum in support of motion 
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and after the jury venire was qualified, Judge Don V. Tibbs heard 
argument in his chambers concerning a Motion for a Protective 
Order filed by the Attorney General's Office of the State of 
Utah, After ruling on this motion, the Sanpete County Attorney 
offered a plea bargain that was substantially ffbetter,,than the 
original offer to the Defendants David L. Mills, Michael A. Land, 
and Jeffrey C. Eaton. 
This offer was not accepted by Michael A Land or David L 
Mills. Additional negotiations were undertaken by the 
Defendant's attorneys and the Sanpete County Attorney. While I 
(Jeffery P. Gleave) was discussing with the Defendant, David L. 
Mills, the modifications Mr. Blackham had offered to him, Mr. 
Douglas Neeley, the attorney for Defendants Eaton and Land 
returned to the room and announced that Mr. Blackham had stated 
that either all of the Defendants were required to accept the 
offered plea bargain or none of them would be permitted to accept 
it. 
The Defendant Jeffrey C. Eaton was facing trial on 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon at a Correctional Facility, a 
second degree felony and Riot, a third degree felony. He was 
very desirous of accepting the plea bargain and pleading to two 
amended Class A misdemeanor counts and kept "encouraging" Mills 
and Land to accept the offered plea bargain. 
Eventually, all the Defendants plead guilty to the counts in 
the amended information on March 21, 1994. 
aRGPiqsPT 
A portion of the guarantees granted to all accused persons 
in criminal prosecutions, by Article I Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah, includes: the right to appear and defend 
State v. Bolin, et al., 
Memorandum in support of motion 
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in person and by counsel, to testify in his own defense and the 
right to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury. It is well 
understood that the defendant may waive these rights if certain 
requirements are met. An important requirement that must be 
satisfied is that the waiver must be voluntary. 
To withdraw a guilty plea defendant must show good cause and 
with leave of the court. U.C.A. 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended). 
Good cause exists where the plea was entered involuntarily. 
State v. Forsvth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977). In Forsyth, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, "we are in full agreement with the 
proposition that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear 
that the accused had a clear understanding of the charge and 
without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement 
voluntarily entered such plea.11 Id. at 338-39. 
In the instant case, the Defendant was subjected to undue 
influence and coercion by his Codefendants and the Sanpete County 
Attorney because if he had stated he did not want to plead guilty 
to the amended information, the other Codefendants who desired to 
accept the "deal" would not have been allowed to do so. 
In this case Defendant Mills, had made a Motion to Sever the 
Defendants for purposes of trial. However, this Motion had been 
denied and he was involuntarily placed in a position where he 
would stand trial not alone but with several other Defendants 
which he felt was not is his best interests. Furthermore, on 
March 21, 1994, he was placed in position where he was required 
to acquiesce in the offered bargain or suffer the consequences 
from his fellow Codefendants. 
Therefore, it seems apparent that by requiring the 
Defendants to collectively accept the offered plea bargain and if 
State v. Bolin, et al., 
Memorandum in support of motion 
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not, prohibiting them from accepting it individually, that there 
was coercion and undue influence exerted on Defendant Mills to 
plead guilty to reduced charges. As stated in Forsyth, Id., good 
cause exists to withdraw the plea if it was entered with either 
undue influence or coercion which would render the plea 
involuntary. Here it seems that both undue influence and 
coercion are present which makes the voluntariness of the plea 
doubly flawed. 
DATED this j^_ day of April, 1994. 
'FffiV P. GLEAVE 
jorriey for Defendant 
David L. M i l l s 
^ - » -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS and AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MILLS was hand 
delivered to the following, this /£ day of April, 1994. 
Ross C. Blackham 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
\il. ^-L-






























IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DAVID L. MILLS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 931600154 
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of May 1994, 
commencing at 10:00 a.m., that the above entitled matter 
came on regularly before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County 
of Sanpete, State of Utah, at the Sanpete County Courthouse, 
Manti, Utah; 
That at the conclusion of the above entitled 
proceedings JEFFREY P. GLEAVE, Counsel for defendant in the 
above entitled action, requested a copy of the TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS and that TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS appears 
herein as follows: 
J. M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT REPORTER 
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
MANTI, UTAH 84642 
r«uc ^ 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
SANPETE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main Street 
Manti, UT 84642 
For the Defendant: JEFFERY P. GLEAVE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
195 North 100 East, #205 




TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 3 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 3 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES 
DAVID L. MILLS 
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave 4 
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham 8 
JEFFERY EATON 
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave 11, 13 
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham 12 
MICHAEL LAND 
Direct Examination by Mr. Gleave 13 
Cross Examination bv Mr. Blackham 15 




4TH MAY 1994 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: The next matter is 0154 the State 
of Utah vs. David L. Mills, Mr. Blackham for the state of 
Utah and Mr. Jeffery P. Gleave for the defendant. 
The record should indicate the defendant, Mr. 
Mills, is present, isn't he? 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Mills is present, personally. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
THE COURT: The matter is before the Court on a 
motion to withdraw plea. I have—for the purpose of the 
record, I have examined the plea, the memorandum filed in 
connection with the case. The record should also indicate 
that I'm the Judge that took the pleas. 
All right. I'll hear you. 
MR. GLEAVE: Your Honor, we we're simply claiming 
that Mr. Mills' plea u/as involuntarily to the charges u/hich 
were relevant at the prison on August 9th. We're prepared 
to present testimony, if the Court feels is necessary. 
THE COURT: It's not a matter of what I feel, 
counsel. I assume you're trying to make a record. 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes. 
I believe it's the State's position that strict 
compliance with Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
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PROCEDURE were followed in that the Court found that the 
Plea u/as in fact, voluntary. At this time, Your Honor, I 
would like to call David Mills. 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES 
THE COURT: All right. Just swe^r Mr. Mills, 
(won't be necessary for you to raise your hands. 
[WITNESS SWORN BY THE CLERK IN OPEN COURT] 
DAVID L. MILLS, called and su/orn at the instance of 
defendant, himself, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFERY: 
1 0 Mr. Mills, would you please stats your name. 
A David L. Mills. 
2 Q How old are you? 
A 21. 
3 Q And where do you live, David? 
A In the Central Utah Correctional Facility. 
4 Q And you're a prisoner of the facility? 
A Yes. 
5 Q Do you have a parole date? 
A No. 
6 Q How long do you expect to be in prison, David? 
A A long time. 





























1 0 Okay. On March 21st, do you recall March 21st. 
the day we were supposed to go to trial? 
THE COURT: Counsel, are you just gonna go back 
and lay a record of what actually happened by the record, 
because I was there. It's all shown by the minutes. The 
record would show all this. 
MR. GLEAVE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's go into something that the 
record doesn't show, because Tfve got a lot of things to do 
today and— 
MR. GLEAVE: Um-hm. 
2 0 On March 21st you were presented with a plea 
bargain, which was conveyed to you by me; is that correct? 
WITNESS: A Yes. 
3 Q What was that, plea bargain? 
A That I was to agree to plead guilty to an 
amended—to amended charges that two felonies would be 
dismissed. 
4 Q Was there anything else concerning a plea 
bargain, whether you could accept that individually? 
A I had to—I couldn't—if I had—if I didn't want 
to take it, then my co-defendants couldn't take it either. 
We had to accept it as a group. 



























rnv jc u 
A I was t o l d , yeah, y e s . 
1 Q Were you willing to accept that plea bargain? 
A No. Not at first T wasn't, no. 
2 Q Describe why you eventually accepted it? 
A Well, it began with, you know, I was told that 
members of the—well, it started with the jury selection 
[with a lot of the members of the jury and their relations to 
officers that I had come in contact with in the prison and 
knowing that these people—I didn't feel that I would get a 
fair jury trial because they wouldn't be impartial with me 
having contact with their spouses or brothers or whatever, 
whatever relation they were to them, and just the pressure 
from the Court attorney making—saying that we all had to 
take it at one thing and me with the possibility of 
retaliation from other inmates if I decided not to take it. 
I also had—I was also told that members of the jury were 
prejudiced against me and I just really didn't—I didn't 
feel that I would get a fair trial. I was pressurred and 
coerced into accepting it. 
3 Q Who told you that members of the jury were 
prejudiced against you? 
A Mr. Neeley. 
4 Q What did Mr. Neeley say? 
A He told me—to put it plainly, he told me that 



























soon hang me as look at me. And I don't knou/ who they were, 
so I there was no way of me striking them from the jury 
selection. 
1 Q Why did you eventually decide to accept the plea 
bargain? 
A Because of the—I feared retaliation from other 
sources, so I just, you know, I— 
2 Q Did you attempt to plead no contest? 
A Yes. 
3 Q What happened? 
A I was told that it wasnft acceptable, that I 
couldn't. 
4 Q Do you recall—well, what were your feelings 
about being tried with your co-defendants? 
A I was against it from the start 
MR. BLACKHAM: I object to what his feelings were 
about that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
WITNESS: A Well, I believe it was— 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. GLEAVE: Q Okay. When you entered 
your plea, do you remember the Judge asking you if your plea 
was voluntary? 
WITNESS: A No. I don't remember. But he 
could have said it. I don't remember him, though. 
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1 Q Okay. How would your co-defendants have known 
you rejected the plea? 
A When u/e went back out, if I would have said no, 
it would have been obvious. When we went back out to plea, 
if I would have said no, you know, they would have been 
standing right there. They would have known when I said no. 
2 Q They would have heard you? 
A Yeah. 
3 Q Why didn't you tell the Judge your feeling it was 
involuntarily? 
A We were all sitting right there. Everybody was 
just like it is right now. I mean if I would have said 
that, it would have been just the same as me saying no 
anyway. 
4 0 Your impression of the plea, did you benefit from 
accepting the plea? 
A No. No. I don't feel that I did. 
5 Q Will you get out of prison any earlier, in your 
opinion? 
A No. Without question. 
MR. GLEAVE: No more, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blackham? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKHAM: 



























at the time, to express ever—during the morning proceedings 
down there, did you ever ask your lawyer to express these 
concerns to the prosecutor? 
A I told—I told him that I wanted to plead no 
contest, because of the—yeah, yeah. Yes, I told him this, 
because it wasn't—I wasn't—I didn't want to plead guilty. 
But knowing that— 
1 Q Wait a minute. You're kind of getting away from 
my question. 
Did you express these concerns that you've just 
testified about to your lawyer that morning? 
A Yeah. 
2 Q Did you tell him—did you tell him that you had 
been threatened or put in fear of retaliation in any manner? 
A No. 
3 Q As a matter of fact, it was Mr. Land and Mr. 
Eaton who were in the proceedings with you that morning; 
correct? 
A Yes. 
4 Q And isn't it true, Mr. Miles, that in fact, 
neither one of those guys ever threatened you that morning? 
A No. 
5 Q They did not threaten you; correct? 
A Not in the way. Well, it depends on what you're 
trying to say. I don't think I understand what you are 
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trial to say. 
1 Q Let me clarify. 
A They didn't say—no—"\l'e are gonna get you." No. 
they didn't say that. 
2 Q Okay. That's what I'm asking. Thank you. 
Did you ever express to the prosecutor or to the 
Judge that you u/ere under some fear or that you had been 
threatened in any way by anybody that morning? 
A No. 
MR. BLACKHAM: That's all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Gleave? 
MR. GLEAVE: One further question Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLEAVE: 
3 Q What—why did you feel that there would be 
retaliation, if you rejected the plea? 
A Because I knew. It's not like something that has 
to be told out to you. you know, in those exact words. It's 
just it's like an unsaid thing. You just—just you know. 
You just know. 
4 Q And you knew that if you rejected that plea that 
there would b e — 
A Yeah. See, there was talk about it. But not in 
me exactly, but just whoever didn't go along with it; do you 



























So that's why—okay. So if I was to say did they 
threaten me? 
No. Not me, as in saying David Mills. But it's 
in a general way it's just whoever didn't go along with it. 
MR. BLACKHAM: No questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. GLEAVE: Jeffery Eaton. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE COURT: Will you swear Mr. Eaton. You don't 
have to raise your hand, Mr. Eaton. 
[WITNESS SWORN BY THE CLERK IN OPEN COURT] 
JEFFERY EATON, called and sworn at the instance of 
defendant, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLEAVE: 
1 Q Jeff, where do you live? 
A Central Utah Correctional Facility. 
MR. GLEAVE: Your Honor, I feel it's necessary 
just a couple of direct questions to set the background. 
2 Q When was your parole date? 
WITNESS: A I was scheduled to parole 
August 10th, 1993. 
3 Q On March 21stf if you accepted the plea bargain, 
when did you feel that you would be released from prison? 



























January/February of '95. 
1 Q What charges u/ere you going to be tried on? 
A A second degree felony of possession of a u/eapon 
and third degree felony of rioting. 
2 Q And if you had proceeded u/ith trial and been 
found guilty, when did you expect to be released from prison 
on those charges? 
A Five to eight years from now. 
3 Q Was it in your interest to accept the plea 
bargain? 
A Yes. 
4 Q Did you understand the plea bargain that if the 
co-defendants didn't accept it, you would not be able to 
accept it? 
A Yes. 
MR. GLEAVE: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKHAM: 
5 Q Mr. Eaton, Mr. Mills says that you never directly 
threatened him or threatened him with bodily injury, 
retaliation in any manner; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
MR. BLACKHAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 



























THE COURT: Counsel? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLEAVE: 
1 Q One other question. Mr. Eaton— 
THE COURT: I think you're through with Mr. 
Eaton, counsel. 
MR. GLEAVE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Well, go ahead. Ask your question. 
MR. GLEAVE: Q To threaten someone in 
prison does a person have to verbally threaten them? 
A No. There's unsaid rules in a prison 
environment. There's lust things that don't even need to be 
said, but things that all prisoners knou/ automatically. 
MR. GLEAVE: That's all. 
MR. BLACKHAM: No further questions. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Call your next u/itness. 
MR. GLEAVE: Michael Land. 
THE COURT: Will you please su/ear Mr. Land. 
lu/itness sworn by the clerk in open court] 
MICHAEL LAND, called and sworn at the instance of 
defendant, testified as follou/s: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLEAVE: 
2 Q Now, Michael, where do you live? 
A Urn, I'm now housed in Draper, Utah, Unit 2. 
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1 Q Did you have a parole date? 
A Yes. I was supposed to be released on August the 
10th, 1993. 
2 Q Did you feel it was in your best interest to 
accept a plea bargain? 
A Ah, not at first. We was all three of us was 
against it. Most of us—most of us inmates were against 
taking a plea bargain and it was to our best interest to 
stick together. It was to our best interest to stick 
together, you know, for a lot of inmates were pressurred 
into sticking together, you know, because it was just pure 
pressure. But when it came down to it and they offered to 
plea bargain, I think Mr. Mills was pressurred into it 
because he wanted to—me and him didn't want to at all. We 
didn't want to accept a plea bargain. But Mr. Eaton here, 
he had a different opinion, you know, so we figured well, if 
ue all go to trial, then we're all gonna be found guilty. 
After we looked at—after we went to the roster sheet and we 
realized that everybody was mostly related we felt this 
community would be prejudiced towards us. 
3 Q Okay. If you had gone to trial and been found 
guilty, when did you expect to be released from prison? 
A Anywhere from 5 to 10 years from now. 
4 Q If you accepted the plea bargain, when did you 



























A Anywhere from August '94 to December '94—or 
February '95. 
1 Q Considerably short period of time? 
A A short period of time. 
MR. GLEAVE: That's all, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKHAM: 
2 Q Mr. Land, Mr. Mills said that you never directly 
threatened him or threatened retaliation against him in 
order to get this plea from him; is that also correct? 
A No. I did not. But like I said,— 
3 Q No. Wait. Just ansu/er. 
You did not directly threaten him; is that 
correct? 
A No. T d i d not. 
MR. BLACKHAM: That's all. 
MR. GLEAVE: No further witnesses, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else. Mr. Blackham? 
MR. BLACKHAM: No, Your Honor. I intend to ask 
the Court to make a finding, as to the proceedings that day, 
and I know the Court doesn't want to go through that, but as 
long as that' s — 
THE COURT: I don't want to go through what? 
MR. BLACKHAM: I think it's important that the 
record reflect, Your Honor, that the Court went through 
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questions in proceedings that day and I don't know whether 
you can find that without further testimony about it or not. 
I gather, from the comments by Mr. Gleave, that you were 
aware of the proceedings that you conducted them- But I 
don't intend to call witnesses on any of the other issues. 
THE COURT: So you rest? 
MR. BLACKHAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: You rest? 
MR. GLEAVE: One other item. Your Honor. At this 
time we do not wish to address a strict compliance 
requirements with the Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. However, we would like to reserve that 
procedure, if this ruling is is adverse to us today. 
THE COURT: Adverse what issue? Tell me what 
you're talking about. Get specific. 
You claim I didn't comply with Rule 11? 
MR. GLEAVE: I don't want to claim that right 
now, but I would like to reserve that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you were present. Didn't I ask 
you at one time if there was any reason why I should not 
sentence them? 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes, you did, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You told me there was no reason; 
isn't that what you told me? 
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THE COURT: Now you d o n ' t u/ant t o be bound by 
MR. GLEAVE: No. I d o n ' t u/ant t o be bound by 
whether— 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. GLEAVE: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Do you want to argue the matter? 
MR. BLACKHAM: I submit it, Your Honor. I 
believe there's been compliance with Rule 11. I don't 
believe there's anything you've heard today to present 
evidence of threats, retaliation, promises in any manner to 
invalidate the plea. 
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
THE COURT: The motion to withdraw the plea is 
denied. I don't see any than reason that I should allow the 
plea to be withdrawn. 
I advised them of their constitutional rights. 
In my opinion that was voluntarily and the record should 
indicate that I sat down there and waited with a jury 
paneled, ready to go, for nearly four or five hours while in 
this matter they went over and advised all the rights. I 
think this is just a dilatory procedure for the purpose of 
causing the Court problems and taking the public's time. 
The motion is denied. 
FAUb 10 
Thank you. 
MR. GLEAVE: Okay. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADDENDUM C 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM (#0357) 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (801) 835-6381 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DAVID L. MILLS, 
Plaintiff, 1 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DAVID MILL'S 
MOTIOK TO WITHDRAW 
I GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 931600154 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
The above case having come before the Court on May 4, 1994 on 
Defendant David Mill's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney 
Jeffery P. Gleave. The State was represented by Ross C. Blackham, 
Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having heard testimony from 
witnesses now enters the following findings and orders 
1) That on March 21, 1994, the Defendant David L. Mills 
appeared before the Court and entered a guilty plea to Attempted 
Riot, a Class A Misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail, a Class 
A Misdemeanor. 
2) That Defendant, at the time, was personally present and 
represented by his attorney Jeffery P. Gleave. 
X'o#V&\ 
-2-
3) That prior to the entry of the plea that the Defendant and 
his attorney had an excess of 2 hours to discuss a plea bargain 
with the State in the case. 
4) That at the time of accepting the plea the Court, on the 
record, and in the presence of the Defendant and his attorney 
advised him of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and specifically asked the Defendant and his 
attorney if there was any reason why he should not accept a plea. 
Defendants counsel and Defendant affirmatively stated that there 
was no reason. 
5) That the Court finds that there were not any threats made 
to the Defendant from co-defendants in this case in order to obtain 
his plea. 
6) From the foregoing findings the Court fails to find good 
cause for the Motion to Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea and the 
Motion is hereby denied. 
DATED this ft) dav of May, 1994. 




> I DON V. TIBBS 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have nailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrunent to the Defendant's attorney, 
Jeffery P. Gleave at HUNT AND GLEAVE 195 North 100 East, Suite 
205, Richfield, Utah 84"3l, postage prepaid this // dav of April,, 
1994. ^ A\*p 




Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e) 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, . . . and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements 
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
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